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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT REPRESENTATION, AS FRAUD 
REQUIRES A HEAVIER BURDEN OF PROOF THAN NEGLIGENT 
REPRESENTATION. 
The trial Court ruled that on Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgement/ Plaintiffs were entitled to 
proceed to trial on their claim for fraud in the 
inducement to purchase their home. However/ the trial 
court dismissed all of the Plaintiffs' other claims for 
relief/ including negligent misrepresentation. The law 
in Utah is well settled that a claim for relief may be 
brought under a theory of negligent misrepresentation. 
Dugan v. Jones, 615/ P. 2d 1239 (Utah 1980) at 1246; 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp./ 423 P. 2d 659 (Utah 1967); 
Ellis v. Hale/ 373 P.2d 382 (Utah 1962). 
The distinction between a claim for relief grounded 
in fraud and a claim grounded in negligent misrepresenta-
tion is that the element of "intent" is removed from the 
claim under negligent misrepresentation/ while fraud 
requires proof that the person who made the false 
representation either knew it was false or was reckless 
with respect to its falsity. Negligent misrepresentation 
2 
d o e s n o t r e q u i r e k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s 
f a l s e o r r e c k l e s s . N e g l i g e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o n l y 
r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e p e r s o n making t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a c t 
c a r e l e s s l y o r n e g l i g e n t l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e t r u t h o r 
f a l s i t y o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Hale 373 P . 2d a t 384, 
3 8 5 . 
T h e t r i a l C o u r t f o u n d t h a t from t h e e v i d e n c e 
p r e s e n t e d in P l a i n t i f f s ' and D e f e n d a n t ' s Memorandums and 
o r a l a rgument a t t h e h e a r i n g , P l a i n t i f f s had e s t a b l i s h e d 
a p r i m e f a c i e c a s e f o r f r a u d u l e n t i n d u c e m e n t t o t h e 
e x t e n t t h a t t h e r e d i d e x i s t m a t e r i a l i s s u e s of f a c t which 
n e e d e d t o b e d e c i d e d b y t h e t r i e r o f f a c t . 
I n c o n g r u e n t l y , h o w e v e r , a p p a r e n t l y r e l y i n g on t h e same 
e v i d e n c e t h e c o u r t be low d i s m i s s e d p l a i n t i f f s ' c l a i m f o r 
n e g l i g e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . The lower C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n 
t o d i s m i s s t h e P l a i n t i f f s ' c l a i m o f n e g l i g e n t m i s -
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w h i l e r e q u i r i n g P l a i n t i f f s t o p r o c e e d t o 
t r i a l on t h e c l a i m of f r a u d i s n o t good l aw. 
The d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n f r a u d u l e n t i nducemen t and 
n e g l i g e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w h i c h i n d u c e s t h e s a m e 
b e h a v i o r , i s t h e i n t e n t , knowledge o r s c i e n t e r of t h e 
a c t i o n . I n t h i s c a s e , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w e r e made t o 
a p p e l l a n t s , u p o n w h i c h a p p e l l a n t s r e l i e d t o t h e i r 
3 
detriment and injury. One of the key issues for trial is 
the intent or knowledge of those who made the 
representations. It is inconceivable that the Court 
below could rule on this issue that the evidence 
discovered prior to the dispositive motion showed as a 
matter of law that plaintiffs could not possibly prove 
that the statements were made negligently, but could 
prove they were made fraudulently. The Plaintiff should 
be allowed to present for a jury's consideration, the 
elements of both causes of action and allow them to 
determine the Defendants intent at the time of the 
misrepresentations. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS ESTABLISHED THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR 
FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
There are nine elements to the common law tort of 
fraud. Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952). The 
Defendants in their Brief, indicate that their Motion for 
Summary Judgment was based on only two elements i.e., 
scienter and representations concerning presently 
existing material facts for purposes of this appeal. 
4 
A. Plaintiffs have shown presently existing material 
facts for trial* 
A fact is material if it relates to a matter of 
importance as opposed to a minor or trivial detail. A 
representation of fact is material if: 1. A reasonable 
person in Plaintiffs position has attached importance to 
its existence in determining his choice of action in the 
transaction or, 2. If Defendants knew, or had reason to 
know, that Plaintiffs considered, or were likely to 
consider, the matter as important in determining its 
choice of action, regardless of whether a reasonable 
person would so consider it. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts Section 538 (1977). 
In reviewing the deposition testimony of Reed and 
Norma Evans, the record is replete with testimony as to 
the importance of the view and location of future 
building. (R. 316, Deposition Reed Evans, page 32, lines 
12 through 16; and Deposition Norma Evans, page 32, lines 
10 through 14.) The Evans could have purchased any one 
of a number of twin homes within the same location, but, 
purchased the "view" and the fact that the lot 
immediately west of their home was to contain a 
landscaped walkway and park. With these specific 
5 
representations being made, the Evans were induced to 
purchase their home. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Berkeley Bank for 
Cooperatives v. A. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1980) 
explained, quoting Harper & James, The Law of Torts Vol. 
1, 571-72 (1956), that a closely similar problem is 
raised by a promise or statement of future conduct by 
one, who at the time, intends not to fulfill the promise. 
The promise itself is regarded as a representation of a 
present intention to perform. Hence, such a promise, 
made by one not intending to perform, operates as a 
misrepresentation — a representation of the speakers 
state of mind, at the time, and is actionable as a 
representation of "fact1'. "To profess an intent, to do 
or not to do, when the party intends the contrary, is as 
clear a case of misrepresentation and fraud as could be 
made." In this case, the Plaintiffs contend that 
Defendants claimed through their project manager, Dan 
Hucks, that the Defendants would build a landscaped 
walkway, that the lot was to narrow to build on, and that 
the lot would be made a park. Such statements could 
properly be regarded as representations of a present, not 
6 
a future promise, and could be found by a jury to be 
actionable as misrepresentations of fact. 
The court in D. Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assoc., 
Inc., 739 P.2d, 640 (Utah 1987) quoted Berkeley Bank for 
Coops, when it indicated that if defendants "did not 
intend to perform the future promises, when they made 
them, the misrepresentations are actionable." Addendum A 
shows that at the time the subdivision was originally 
platted, there was no provision for a walk way over lot 
150 or a park immediately adjacent thereto, as was 
represented by Defendants. Thus, Defendant/Respondent 
showed the intent at the time to actually build homes 
where they said they would not. The evidence further 
shows that the Defendants actually did proceed as they 
originally intended with the project, and did in fact, 
build on lot 150 in opposite to what they represented to 
Plaintiffs. The fact that Plaintiffs were basing their 
purchase on the view as it then existed prior to the 
purchase of their home, is very material as it determined 
their choice to purchase the home on lot 149; and not one 
of the others available within the project with quite 
similar views. 
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B. Defendants should have shown that the representations 
were false* 
The Defendants argue that the Evans' "belief" that 
material misrepresentations were made to them prior to 
the purchase of their home by Dan Hucks, the project 
manager, and employee of Defendants are not valid and 
provide no basis for recovery. The Defendants' 
justification for this argument are two unrelated cases, 
E. Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America, 405 P.2d 339 
(Utah 1965) and Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Sohm, 
391 P.2d 293 (Utah 1964) stating that mere "suspicion and 
innuendo" and "self-serving testimony of one aggrieved 
person" defeats the fact that the representations made 
were in fact false. This case is distinguishable from 
the above two cases in that they dealt with consumers, 
who when they became disgruntled with their product or 
services, decided to not pay the contractual amounts owed 
and then when sued, used fraud as a defense to their 
payment. In this case the Evans were very happy with the 
home they purchased, have paid for their home in full and 
are only seeking damages caused by Defendants' mis-
representations and adjacent home construction which has 
severally depreciated the value of Plaintiff's home. 
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Defendants deliberate attempt to label Plaintiffs1 
evidence in the context of "belief" should in no way 
negate the facts as shown. Namely, that there were 
representations made by the project manager as to 
material facts that proved to be false. Defendants have 
not shown any evidence contrary to the statements made by 
the Evans through deposition or affidavit, and, 
therefore, have failed to establish the lack of this 
essential element. A. L. Williams 739 P.2d at 640. Mere 
labeling does not necessarily make a fact not reliable or 
truthful but must be opposed by evidence showing such. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS WERE IN THE BUSINESS OF SUPPLYING 
INFORMATION AND SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
Mrs . Evans i n h e r d e p o s i t i o n s a i d "Then, she (Ms. 
B e c k s t e d ) t o o k us ove r t o t h e Lakeview management, and 
t h a t ' s where we t a l k e d a b o u t t h e v i e w . But l i k e I s a y , 
we w o u l d n ' t have bough t i t i f we h a d n ' t have been a s s u r e d 
t h a t we would have t h a t v i e w . B e c a u s e t h a t ' s w h a t we 
w e r e b u y i n g . " (Norma Evans D e p o s i t i o n page 32 l i n e s 10 
t h r o u g h 1 4 ) . A l s o , Mrs. Evans i n d i c a t e d in r e s p o n s e t o 
t h e q u e s t i o n "Who t h e n d i d you t a l k t o ? " " I t h i n k t h e 
9 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons s e t f o r t h above , P l a i n t i f f s / 
Appellants pray t h i s Court to reverse the lower Court ' s 
Order and allow P l a i n t i f f s to proceed to t r i a l on t h e i r 
c la ims prayed fo r , and for what other r e l i e f i t deems 
a p p r o p r i a t e under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . R e s p e c t f u l l y 
submitted t h i s ^ 1 day of December, 1988. 
HJRBANO DflUjGLAS M. DU
KENL<bN W. REEVE 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f s / 
AppeMants 
11 
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Ruling on Defendant ' s Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Case No. 93329 
In regard to the fraud allegation in the representations 
made at the time of purchase, I must admit that I have had some 
problem with this. However, in considering a summary judgment, 
it must be considered in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, it appears there is sufficent issue of fact 
to retain this issue for trial* Defendants' motion in regard to 
the cause of action for fraud is denied insofar as it has to do 
with the alleged misrepresentations made at the time of purchase. 
As to breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiffs' have shown 
nothing that would support such an allegation. Plaintiffs tend 
to cite cases and phrasing of cases which sound good, but do not 
necessarily support their position. Even taking the facts most 
favorable to the plaintiffs, they establish nothing that would 
indicate a fiduciary duty on the part of the defendants. 
Plaintiffs tend to argue along the lines that they had superior 
information and did not tell the plaintiffs, and at the same time 
argue that what they did tell them constitutes fraud. 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in all causes 
of action except for fraud in the inducement at the time of 
purchase. 
In regard to dismissing defendant Honolulu Federal 
Savings and Loan, I again have a problem with plaintiffs1 
position and their briefs. They tend to rely upon allegations, 
and an affidavit that tends to rely upon belief. The affidavit, 
Page 3 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Case No. 93329 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah insurance law, death is not accidental if it 
was the natural and probable consequence of an act or course of 
action undertaken by the insured. The natural and probable 
consequence of an act or course of action is the result which, from 
the insured's point of view, may reasonably be expected. The 
evidence in this case clearly shows that Mr. Hardy expected to die 
as a result of his act and course of action. His death resulting 
from his act and course was action was expected by him and was not 
accidental. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Bryce Hardy's Death from an Overdose of 
Narcotics was not an Accident 
Mrs. Hardy's brief characterizes Beneficial's denial of 
benefits in this case as being based upon an "unstated premise that 
anyone who engages in illegal drug usage has to be deemed to have 
intended to die by virtue of that conduct", or being predicated 
"upon the false premise that Bryce Hardy somehow died as a result 
of a pattern of drug abuse" or being based on the ground that Mr. 
Hardy's conduct "was so reckless that it deprived his death of an 
accidental character". These characterizations of Beneficial's 
position are simply not accurate. Beneficial's argument, pure and 
1 
simple, is that Mr. Hardy's death was not an accident under Utah 
law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "where the insured 
expected or anticipated that death would follow from his or her 
conduct, recovery has been denied" and that "An effect which is the 
natural and probable consequence of an act or course of action is 
not an accident." Hoffman v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 
669 P. 2d 410, 417 and 415 (Utah 1983). In order to determine 
whether an effect is the natural and probable consequence of an act 
or course of action, one must knew what that act or course of 
action was. It must also be determined what the decedent expected 
to result therefrom. 
Mr. Hardy's conduct consisted of a continuous series of 
narcotic ingestion episodes. Beneficial's reference to this 
conduct is directed to the question of what Mr. Hardy's act or 
course of action was and to what he expected or anticipated would 
follow from such acts. It is true, as Mrs. Hardy states, that Mr. 
Hardy's death was the result of one overdose of drugs. The 
question, however, is whether Mr. Hardy expected to die from such 
an overdose of drugs. The evidence clearly shows that he did. The 
facts are that Mr. Hardy's physicians and counselors didn't give 
him "good advice" as argued by Mrs. Hardy. They gave him specific 
instruction that if he continued to ingest drugs he would kill 
himself. Mr. Hardy understood this and expected that that result 
would follow if he continued to ingest drugs. He had, on at least 
two prior occasions, taken overdoses of drugs and nearly died. One 
2 
of these occasions was just five months before his death. When 
hospitalized following that occasion he expressed to his nurse that 
if he didn't stop his act or course of action he would "be dead". 
Mr. Hardy expected to die from exactly what killed him, an overdose 
of drugs. 
None of the cases cited by Mrs. Hardy have facts similar 
to those in this case. None present the situation of a person who 
had almost died on previous occasions fran taking overdoses of 
drugs or who a few months before his death expressed his specific 
understanding that if he continued his course of action he expected 
that he would "be dead". Mr. Hardy clearly expected and 
anticipated that if he kept abusing drugs he would die from an 
episode of drug abuse. He kept abusing drugs and he died from an 
episode of drug abuse. 
Mrs. Hardy also argues that Beneficial was free to 
incorporate a provision into its policy excluding death from drugs 
from coverage and that the Court should not write such an exclusion 
into the policy* Mrs. Hardy misses the point. Beneficial is not 
arguing that all drug related deaths are non-accidental. In many 
cases death from a drug overdose would clearly be accidental. In 
this case, however, the facts prove that Mr. Hardy expected and 
anticipated that his death would follow from his conduct. 
3 
CX3NCIIJSI0N 
Mr. Hardy's death was the natural and probable consequence 
of his own actions. He expected and anticipated those actions 
would result in his death. Mr. Hardy's death was not an accident. 
. «,£ 
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